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ORIGINAL RESEARCH / 2021

How Facebook influenced Myanmar’s 2021 Spring Revolution

A study of Facebook, agenda-setting, public awareness and collective action during Myanmar’s 2021 Spring Revolution.

CHIT SU SU SANResearch conducted in 2021
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Abstract

How did Facebook influence Myanmar’s 2021 Spring Revolution? The extent to which social media influenced Myanmar's recent upheaval, dubbed "Myanmar's Spring Revolution," has been the subject of considerable dispute. Regardless of one's perspective, the role of social media in facilitating socio-political change is significant, and it has piqued the interest of academics. This article critically examines Facebook's role and draws on events from the 2021 Myanmar revolution. It draws on agenda-setting theory and the topics that attracted attention on Facebook in Myanmar during the revolution. Among Myanmar's internet users, Facebook was the most popular social networking site (SNS) during the period studied. Its popularity and widespread use made it an important part of the revolution. I conducted a qualitative content analysis of Facebook hashtags associated with the revolution and surveyed 30 Myanmar internet users about Facebook’s role. The survey responses and observed Facebook content suggest that participants saw the platform as important for awareness, donation-related communication and social connection during the revolution. These descriptive results do not independently establish the platform’s causal effect on revolutionary outcomes. Users also turned to Facebook to establish or maintain connections with people who shared their interests. Among the purposes identified, social unity emerged as the most important.

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Background: Myanmar politics and social media

Myanmar is an example of a country with weak democratic institutions, with the military playing a major role in politics (Kipgen 2017). Myanmar has had three military coups since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1948: 1962, 1988, and the most recent 2021 military coup, which fuelled the present political unrest. Having effectively controlled the country for more than five decades, the military has played a significant role in politics. Despite the democratic transition and political changes implemented after 2011, the military remains a prominent player in the country's politics.

Under the military-run regime, most citizens did not have access to the internet or mobile phones until the mid-2000s (Asher 2021). With the state-owned telecoms provider, MPT, a SIM card could cost hundreds of dollars; mobile penetration was therefore among the lowest in the world. The government began to liberalise in 2011, and by 2014, two telecommunications firms, Telenor of Norway, and Oredoo of Qatar had been granted permission to join the country. For many Myanmar citizens, this marked their first access to mobile technology, and falling prices encouraged rapid adoption.

Facebook became widely used as mobile connectivity expanded. Telecom liberalisation in the early 2010s, zero-rated Facebook access offered through some mobile providers, and preinstalled applications contributed to its reach. DataReportal estimated 29.00 million social-media users in Myanmar in January 2021, equivalent to 53.1% of the population; this is not a verified count of Facebook users or unique individuals. This study focuses on Facebook because of its prominent role in Myanmar’s digital public sphere (Asher 2021; DataReportal 2021).

In the early hours of 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military detained State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and other political leaders and seized power. The coup prompted protests, civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts and online organising amid repeated restrictions on internet access. The National Unity Government (NUG) was announced on 16 April 2021; it announced the formation of the People’s Defence Force (PDF) on 5 May 2021. These developments formed part of the widening resistance to military rule.

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The role of social media in political revolutions

The rise of social media has been heralded as a revolutionary means for politicians to connect directly with citizens (Grant, Moon, & Grant 2010), people to participate in online political debates (Ifukor 2010), and non-elites (such as bloggers, party representatives and celebrities) to influence political discourse (Sweetser, Porter, Chung, & Kim 2008). Social media encourages active involvement among media consumers (Burns 2010), offering a fertile ground for online political activity.

Social media platforms can lower barriers to sharing material critical of a government, particularly when traditional media are tightly controlled. They can also facilitate information exchange and coordination around political activities. However, the effects vary by movement and context, and online participation cannot by itself demonstrate causation (Zhuravskaya et al. 2020). The comparative research below situates this study alongside earlier work on social media and political mobilisation.

TABLE 01 / PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Social media and political mobilisation: comparative studies

StudyResearch focusMethodReported findings
Ali et al. (2019)Social media, social capital and sociopolitical change in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.Interpretative case study; secondary research.Examines relationships among social networks, social capital and acculturation, and implications for technology adoption and policy.
Clarke & Kocak (2020)How Facebook and Twitter contributed to recruitment, protest planning and live logistical updates during the Egyptian uprising.Qualitative and quantitative evidence, including interviews, social-media data and surveys.Identifies Facebook-enabled recruitment and planning and Twitter-enabled live updates as important to the first demonstration’s mobilisation.
Comparison of the two studies discussed in the original literature review. Years follow the reference list.
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Literature review: agenda-setting theory

Numerous studies suggest that news media influence public perceptions of political ideas. McCombs and Valenzuela (2007) stated that the concepts of media agenda-setting theory could be considered the fundamental basis for expanding the discussion because it focuses on the effects that mass media can have on mainstream discourse and the importance of social issues as a result of the pervasiveness of social media in daily lives and the day-to-day repetition of relevant content, and the attributions of agenda-setting theory contribute to our understanding of how such effects arise. Bennett and Iyengar (2008) claimed in their essay, highlighting the return of the period of minimum effects, that media polarisation and expanding chances for media choice have elevated selective exposure to a significant mechanism in the way media affect public perception. As a result of recent changes in the media environment and the rising tendency towards multi-channel media consumption, conventional media's agenda-setting impact has been reduced. However, conventional media continue to dominate public agendas and public dialogue on significant problems and subjects, given that most people only have access to a small number of news sources, principally mainstream media (Takeshita, 2005). Only a few studies have explicitly

examined the agenda-setting theory's application to a divided media environment.

These reviews demonstrate that, despite audience fragmentation, media impacts at the individual level remain because of specialised media use (see figure 1.1 on the case of Myanmar’s Spring). Citizens continue to be influenced by the media they use most frequently; in this study, that medium is Facebook, while mainstream media remains under military control, demonstrating that agenda-setting theory continues to account for media effects on a political level (Shehata & Stromback 2013).

FIGURE 01 / RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
SUBJECTMyanmar’s 2021 Spring Revolution
↓
FACEBOOK POSTS & HASHTAGSSecond-level agenda-setting: which attributes receive attention?
01 / NEUTRALInformation & updates
02 / OPPOSING THE COUPResistance & mobilisation
03 / SUPPORTING THE MILITARYPro-coup narratives

Interpretive redraw of the paper’s original conceptual figure. Categories describe the research coding, not the author's endorsement.

Figure 1. Second-level agenda-setting framework, redesigned from the original research figure.
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Research methods

To examine Facebook’s role and user engagement over time, I used both qualitative content analysis and survey methods on the most popular hashtags, examining dominant themes, most frequently used words, and users' perspectives on Facebook's role in the revolution. The content analysis covers the nine months between 1st February 2021, the start of the coup, and 31st October 2021, on the ten most popular hashtags on Facebook, analysing ten posts in each of three three-month time intervals: February-April, May-July, and August-October, for a total of 300 posts. The data collection method used was a questionnaire completed by a random sample of Myanmar's daily Facebook users. The questionnaire begins with respondents’ demographic information. The second section includes six questions concerning users' Facebook usage patterns and views on Facebook’s usefulness.

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Content analysis and results

Drawing on second-level agenda-setting theory, this study analyses the major themes in ten of the most popular hashtags taken from Myanmar's Spring movement, which are divided into three categories (neutral, military supporting, and opposing) in associated Facebook postings. The primary objective of this analysis is to examine whether that media agenda-setting theory applies to the revolution's substance. It also examines the three categories of issues (see Figure 2) that are commonly discussed on Facebook. A qualitative content analysis of media material is undertaken, as well as a study of the most frequently used terms, to collectively explore the most often occurring topics. Across the three time intervals, the 10 most reacted hashtags were categorised as #WhatshappenInMyanmar, #MilitaryCoupInMyanmar (neutral themes), #GZTerrorists, #PDFTerrorists, #WeRejectNUG, #WeSupportMyanmatArmy (military supporting theme), and #SaveMyanmar, #RejectMilitaryCoup, #RespectOurVotes, and #CivilDisobedienceMovement (military coup opposing theme).

Historical context: Facebook was also implicated in harmful misinformation. In 2014, an unsubstantiated rape allegation spread online and was amplified by ultranationalist monk Wirathu before deadly communal violence in Mandalay. Later reporting found the accusation false. This example illustrates the risks of misinformation alongside the platform’s uses for political communication (see additional verification sources below).

FIGURE 02 / CONTENT ANALYSIS
How the study classified ten Facebook hashtags
Neutral / descriptive#WhatshappenInMyanmar#MilitaryCoupInMyanmar
Opposing the coup#SaveMyanmar#RejectMilitaryCoup#RespectOurVotes#CivilDisobedienceMovement
Supporting the military#GZTerrorists#PDFTerrorists#WeRejectNUG#WeSupportMyanmatArmy
Figure 2. Original coding categories and hashtag spellings retained. Categorisation reflects the author's 2021 content analysis, not independent validation of each hashtag’s prevalence.
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Survey analysis and results

ORIGINAL 2021 SURVEY / N = 30

What the respondents actually reported

These results describe responses from the study's 30-person survey. They do not measure Myanmar’s population or prove that Facebook caused an outcome.

28 / 30reported using Facebook93.3% · platform-use item
21 / 30joined Facebook trends related to the revolution70% · participation item
27 / 30believed Facebook contributed to society90% · opinion item

What respondents said they saw on Facebook

Multiple-answer survey item; percentages are out of 30 respondents.

Donation-related posts
22/30
Awareness raising
19/30
Reliable news
18/30
Political criticism
15/30
Misleading information
10/30
Political satire
10/30
Political propaganda
7/30
Source: original research, Table 2. These categories overlap; totals should not be added together.

Participation in Facebook trends

Yes · 21No · 9

70% yes; 30% no (n = 30).

Believed Facebook contributed to society

Yes · 27

90% yes; 10% no (n = 30). This is a perception, not a causal test.

The survey was used to assess the daily Myanmar Facebook users' viewpoints on the importance of Facebook. The survey analysis (see Appendix 1.0 for the questions) uses eight questions to establish 30 randomly selected anonymous respondents' basic demographic information, their Facebook usage patterns, and perspectives on political agenda setting contents on Facebook (Table 2).

TABLE 02 / SURVEY RESULTS

Respondent profile and responses

Thirty respondents participated in the 2021 survey. Values below are reproduced from the source table; categories that allow multiple responses are displayed separately.

Age of respondents

30 respondents · single selection

18–2428 / 30
24–301 / 30
50+1 / 30

Gender of respondents

30 respondents · single selection

Female19 / 30
Male8 / 30
Other2 / 30
Not stated1 / 30

Social platforms used

Multiple selections allowed · 30 respondents

Facebook28 / 30
Instagram26 / 30
Telegram12 / 30
Snapchat8 / 30
TikTok5 / 30
Twitter5 / 30

Perceived usefulness of Facebook

Rating from 1 (least) to 10 (most) · 30 respondents

3 / 102 / 30
4 / 101 / 30
5 / 104 / 30
6 / 104 / 30
7 / 105 / 30
8 / 108 / 30
9 / 105 / 30
10 / 101 / 30

Participation in online campaigns

Reported campaign types; original counts. Categories may refer to a subset of respondents.

Flower Strike5
Blue Shirt 4 Burma3
Three-finger sign3
Silence Revolution1
Donations1
Sharing1
Justice campaign1
Student campaign1
Source: Chit Su Su San, original survey (2021), Table 2. Response categories have not been merged or estimated. The campaign-type rows are presented as counts because the original percentages appear to use a smaller response base.
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Survey interpretation

The results suggest that most respondents engaged with the revolution via Facebook by sharing information, participating in online campaigns, and donating to their parties. Respondents viewed Facebook as a social networking platform capable of communicating the revolution to people worldwide. It provided a convenient way to share timely news and raise awareness, helping attract international support. Thus, Facebook served as a source of information for people unaware of the revolution and supported social unity. However, as the content analysis illustrates, misleading information could also intensify social conflict.

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Conclusion

Overall, social networking tools have been effective in mobilising large-scale protests (even among those who are not involved in political affairs) not only in the case of Myanmar's Spring revolution, but also in other incidents (e.g., the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, the #Occupy Wall Street movement and the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States, Gezi Park protests in Turkey, and so on). Furthermore, the ecosystem established by social media does not reflect the whole population; it is still skewed towards the top socioeconomic sectors of society. Furthermore, social media fostered individual political empowerment, instilling faith in people's capacity to affect change in their political environment. This was shown in the high percentage of engagement during the early stages of the Myanmar revolution.

This study has broadened my understanding of the importance of social media as a significant resource in the success of contemporary social movements in a changing context. This paper's research was based on secondary data gathered from a variety of sources that covered not only the Myanmar revolution, as well as other demonstrations and uprisings, but also studies that looked at the link between Facebook's significance in social/political transformation, as well as its impact on the revolution.

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Ethical statement

For this paper, a survey was created to collect data to critically evaluate the public's perspectives on this issue in relation to genuine facts, and it was also approved by the tutor to assure the integrity and research ethics of the questions and this study. The survey was quick and simple to comprehend for each participant, but it should also avoid unduly engaging personal facts and be handled in a courteous and non-intrusive manner to safeguard participants' privacy and create a cordial environment throughout the process. Before participants began the survey, a brief introduction is provided to ensure that all participants are over the age of 18 and are fully aware of the main purpose of this survey as well as other details such as the number of questions and the time required to complete them; additionally, they are informed that they have the right to ask for help from the programme coordinator via email or exit the page at any time. Finally, the survey was anonymous throughout, and its confidentiality will be maintained since the replies gathered will only be utilised for the examination of this research. Furthermore, this study follows the 8 principles of the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research: Honesty, Rigour, Transparency, Fairness, Respect, Recognition, Accountability and Promotion.

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References

Ali, M., Azabb, N., Sorourc, M. K., Dora, M. 2019, ‘Integration v. polarisation among social media users: Perspectives through the social capital theory on the recent Egyptian political landscape’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 145, 461-473.

Asher, S. 2021, ‘Myanmar coup: How Facebook became the 'digital tea shop'’, BBC Asia, 4 February, viewed 30 October 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-55929654>.

Bennett, W. L. & Iyengar, S. 2008, ‘A new era of minimal effects? The changing foundations of political communication’, Journal of Communication, 58, 707–31.

Clarke, K. & Kocak, K. 2020, ‘Launching Revolution: Social Media and the Egyptian Uprising’s First Movers’, British Journal of Political Science, 50, 1025–1045

Datareportal 2021, Digital 2021 Myanmar, internet users’ statistics, viewed 31 October 2021, < https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2021-myanmar>

Grant, W. J., Moon, B., & Grant, J. B. 2010, ‘Digital dialogue? Australian politicians’ use of the social network tool twitters’, Australian Journal of Political Science, 45(4), 579–604.

Ifukor, P. 2010, ‘“Elections” or “selections”? Blogging and Twittering the Nigerian 2007 general elections’, Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 30(6), 398–414.

Kipgen, N. 2017, ‘Militarization of Politics in Myanmar and Thailand’, International Studies, 53(2), 153-172.

McCombs, M., & Valenzuela, S. 2007, ‘The Agenda-setting theory/ La teoría agenda-setting’, Cuadernos de Información, 20, 44-51.

Shehata, A. & Stromback, J., 2013, ‘Not (yet) a new era of minimal effects: A study of agenda-setting at the aggregate and individual levels, The International Journal of Press/Politics, 18, 234–255.

Sweetser, K. D., Porter, L.V., Chung, D. & Kim, E. 2008, ‘Credibility and the uses of blogs among professionals in the information industry’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 85, 169– 185.

Takeshita, T. 2005, ‘Current critical problems in agenda-setting research’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18, 275–96.

Zhuravskaya, E., Petrova, M. & Enikolopov, R. 2020, ‘Political Effects of the Internet and Social Media’, Annual Review of Economics, 12, 415–38.

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Appendix

Survey link:

View original survey questionnaire ↗